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Abstract 
The objective of this essay is to provide the beginning of a principled classification of 
some of the ways space is intelligently used. Studies of planning have typically focused on 
the temporal ordering of action, leaving as unaddressed, questions of where to lay down 
instruments, ingredients, work-in-progress, and the like. But, in having a body, we are 
spatially located creatures: we must always be facing some direction, have only certain 
objects in view, be within reach of certain others. How we manage the spatial arrangement 
of items around us, is not an afterthought; it is an integral part of the way we think, plan 
and behave. The proposed classification has three main categories: spatial arrangements 
that simplify choice; spatial arrangements that simplify perception; and spatial dynamics 
that simplify internal computation. The data for such a classification is drawn from videos 
of cooking, assembly and packing, everyday observations in supermarkets, workshops and 
playrooms, and experimental studies of subjects playing Tetris, the computer game. This 
study, therefore, focusses on interactive processes in the medium and short term: on how 
agents set up their workplace for particular tasks, and how they continuously manage that 
workplace. 
1. Introduction 
How do we use the space around us? Studies of planning have typically focused 
on the temporal ordering of action, leaving questions of where to lay down 
instruments, ingredients, work-in-progress, and the like, as concerns that can be 
dealt with later. In having a body, we are spatially located creatures: we must 
always be facing some direction, have only certain objects in view, be within 
reach of certain others. How we manage the space around us, then, is not an 
afterthought; it is an integral part of the way we think, plan and behave, a central 
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element in the way we shape the very world that constrains and guides our 
behavior. 
The view I shall present is that whether we are aware of it or not, we are 
constantly organizing and re-organizing our workplace to enhance performance. 
Space is a resource that must be managed, much like time, memory, and energy. 
When we use space well we can often bring the time and memory demands of our 
tasks down to workable levels. We can increase the reliability of execution, and 
the number of jobs we can handle at once. The techniques we use are not always 
obvious, or universal. Some were taught to us, some naturally evolved as we 
improved our performance through practice, some are inevitable consequences of 
having the type of bodies, manipulators and sensors we have. In every case, 
though, the reason space can be used to simplify our cognitive and physical tasks 
is because of the way we are embedded in the world. 
Here is a typical example of using space consciously to improve execution. 
When preparing an elaborate salad, one subject we videotaped, cut each 
vegetable into thin slices and laid them out in tidy rows. There was a row of 
tomatoes, of mushrooms, and of red peppers, each of different length. Our cook 
then brought over a large elliptical platter-ne she had never used before- 
placed it beside the rows and began arranging the items along the circumference. 
The Objective, as was evident from observation and later questioning, was to lay 
out on the platter all the cut items in a uniform and aesthetic manner. She did not 
want to run out of tomatoes early, leaving a tomatoless region, or to close the ring 
of vegetables before all ingredients, peppers, mushrooms, and tomatoes, were 
used up. 
The placement problem our cook faced was to apportion ingredients in a 
uniform manner. This required either eiaborate planning beforehand, recall of 
similar case experience, or online tracking of the relative number of remaining 
slices. Having never worked with an elliptical platter this size, our cook had no 
ready case knowledge to call on. Nor was she eager to count items and measure 
the circumference of the platter, a step she would perform if planning. Instead she 
relied on tracking the remaining slices and her moment by moment adaptive 
skills. To understand why lining up the ingredients in well ordered neatly 
separated rows is clever, requires understanding a fact about human psy- 
chophysics: estimation of length is easier and more reliable than estimation of 
area or volume. By using length to encode number she created a cue or signal in 
the world which she could accurately track. Laying out slices in lines allows more 
precise judgement of the property relative number remaining than clustering the 
slices into groups, or piling them up into heaps. Hence, because of the way the 
human perceptual system works, lining up the slices creates an observable 
property that facilitates execution. 
The function of arrangement in this example is to encode, as explicitly as 
possible (see [22]), a key piece of information about the problem state. It is easy 
to analyze how it works. But, in general, how effectively information is encoded 
in environmental arrangements, depends on the memory, categories, and skills of 
an agent. There is substantial iterature on memory of chess positions that shows 
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that a single glimpse is enough to allow an expert chess player to remember far 
more of a game than is acquired by a novice player after many such glimpses [lo]. 
This suggests that how an expert might store information in arrangements may 
not be evident to novices. It also suggests that even though we often do not 
realize that we are structuring our workplace to help us keep track of processes 
and a host of other useful functions I shall talk about, we should not assume that 
such cognitive or informational structuring is not taking place all the time. 
Informational structuring is commonplace. 
I doubt that this idea will encounter deep opposition. Yet it has been rarely 
explored by psychologists. For instance, in a typical psychological experiment 
about memory, experimentalists et out to test a conjecture by systematically 
altering properties of the stimulus and observing the effect on certain dimensions 
of performance, such as how much, how reliably, how fast the stimulus material is 
remembered in free recall tests, in cued recall tests, or in recognition tests. Such 
tests are supposed to tell us something about how the agent organizes the stimulus 
material internally. Thus, the reason the string KXTNJQXTARWOYE is less 
memorable than the string IBMCIANBCDARPA is that it cannot be broken into 
known strings. After a while, many subjects (depending on background) will 
chunk IBMCIANBCDARPA into four more easily remembered strings IBM CIA 
NBC DARPA. Agents project structure onto the world. But curiously, ex- 
perimentalists rarely allow the subject to play with the stimulus itself to highlight 
the chunks, as we note in scrabble. They do not set up experiments to determine 
how agents choose to structure the stimulus. 
The tendency to delay study of the cognitive/computational virtues of spatial 
arrangement is not confined to psychology. Consider the following blocks world 
problem so fondly studied in planning. A child is asked to build two towers out of 
lettered blocks so that the first tower reads SPACE and the second reads 
MATTERS, as shown in Fig. 1. The blocks are currently scattered around the 
room. If we assume that standard AI blocks restrictions apply then only one block 
can be moved at a time, and only if there is no block on top of it. How shall the 
robot proceed? One method never discussed in the AI literature is to preprocess 
Fig. 1. In (a), a region of the floor is covered with blocks, some in small stacks, others just strewn 
about. In (b), the blocks that spell out the goal towers SPACE MATTERS have been ordered. 
Children often arrange blocks on the ground before stacking them, not simply because it is less 
demanding physically than stacking blocks stably, but because it is easier to solve the problem when 
one can readily see all the letters, and when one can order and re-order blocks without concern for 
balancing them. 
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the blocks so that they spell out the goal stacks SPACE MATTERS horizontally 
on the ground. 
Why might this be a good idea? Because it serves as a proof that there exists a 
goal linearization that will work. If we can build SPACE MATTERS horizontally 
we know we can build it vertically. We can guarantee construction. At first this 
may not seem to be an advance over simply building the towers directly. The 
benefits of informationally structuring the world do not appear to be worth the 
effort. But if we factor in that the constraints on horizontal movement are weaker 
than those on vertical stacking, we can see that to solve the problem on the 
ground is to solve the problem in a more abstract space. On the ground, we can 
pick up and move a block regardless of whether it is sandwiched between blocks. 
And if we leave space between blocks we can insert a block without first shifting 
the others around. Hence, we can save many steps by solving the problem on the 
ground first, since if there is going to be external trial and error search in finding 
the goal ordering, there are far fewer moves to make on the ground. It is easier to 
solve the problem on the ground. 
Such exploitation of the world to improve execution, or to simplify problem 
solving, is typical of situated reasoning. In a host of studies [17,32,43], it has 
been repeatedly shown how human agents make use of resources in the situation 
to help draw conclusions and solve problems rather than use abstract, symbolic 
computations. People make mental tools of things in the environment. Lave [31] 
emphasized the ubiquity of specialized “environmental calculating devices”. For 
instance, in a famous example (de la Rocha [13], cited by Green0 [17]), an 
interviewer asked a subject who had recently enrolled in the Weight Watchers diet 
program, “How much cottage cheese would you have if you served three-fourths 
of the day’s allotment, which is two-thirds of a cup?” After the man muttered that 
he had studied calculus in college, he measured two thirds of a cup of cottage 
cheese, put it on the counter, shaped it into a circle, put a horizontal and a 
vertical line through it, set aside one of the quadrants, and served the rest. 
Instead of multiplying 314 x 213 = 112, he used objects available in the situation 
to solve his problem. 
Now space is always present, and the need to place objects somewhere is a 
constant fact of life. This makes space an invaluable resource to exploit in order 
to facilitate everyday problem solving and planning. 
My goal in what follows is to provide the beginning of a principled classification 
of some of the ways space is intelligently used. The data for such a classification is 
drawn from videos of cooking,’ assembly and packing, everyday observations in 
supermarkets, workshops and playrooms, and experimental studies of subjects 
playing Tetris, the computer game. 
The remainder of the paper is divided into five parts. In the first, I introduce 
’ Among the videotapes of cooking 1 shall refer to is a valuable corpus gathered by Bernard Conein of 
University of Paris. These tapes record the activities of Parisian cooks preparing apple tarts in their 
home kitchens. This material has yet to be fully reported on and I thank Bernard for his permission to 
mention it here. 
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the general framework within which to think of intelligence and space. Our use of 
space is not a special case of intelligent activity which somehow deviates from our 
normal methods of interaction; the way to understand how we exploit spatial 
resources is part of a more general approach to the study of intelligent activity. In 
the next three parts, I present my classification organized into: 
l spatial arrangements that simplify choice; 
l spatial arrangements that simplify perception; 
l spatial dynamics that simplify internal computation. 
In the final part I draw some conclusions. 
2. How to think about everyday activity 
The approach I shall be endorsing falls squarely in the interactionist camp: to 
understand human behavior, and to design robots that scale up to complex 
dynamic environments, we must explore the interaction between agent and 
environment. Humans, to a significant degree, shape and even create the 
environment, which in turn, influences their behavior and development. We can 
study this interactive process along different time scales. As Hammond et al. [18] 
have done, we can study the way agents restore the environment to states which 
they (the agents) have methods to deal with, thereby diminishing uncertainty, 
reducing the number of contingencies that have to be built into programs, and 
allowing streamlining of plans because agents can rely on things being as they 
ought to be, more or less. The stabilizing processes Hammond discusses, are long 
term stabilizations. 
But, equally, we can study interactive processes in the medium and short 
term-as I shall be doing here. For instance, we can study how agents set up their 
workplace for particular tasks, and how they continuously manage that work- 
place. To take an example, an agent who knows he will be acting as a short order 
cook may equip and maintain his kitchen with implements and standard resources 
that are regularly required-i.e. long term structuring. But, on being given a 
particular order, say a mushroom omelet, hash browns and whole wheat toast, the 
cook must still prepare the workplace specifically for that task-laying out the 
eggs, the cut mushrooms, and the requested number of pieces of bread. In setting 
up the workplace for a particular task the cook arranges items so that the work 
that has to be done in the high tempo phases of cooking is both simplified and 
reduced. This readying of the workplace is a medium term structuring of the 
environment. 
Short term structurings arise when ingredients and implements are deployed 
adaptively in the cognitively demanding phase. Once the task has entered the 
main phase, we find that agents, particularly expert agents, constantly re-arrange 
items to make it easy to: 
(1) track the state of the task; 
(2) figure out, remember, or notice the properties signaling what to do next; 
(3) predict the effects of actions. 
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To return to the diner, if several orders are being prepared, we have observed 
short order cooks, clustering the materials for orders together, and leaving knives, 
forks or other utensils near the ingredient to be used next, as if to mark their 
place in their plan. 
Throughout this paper, I shall be operating with several assumptions it is best 
to make explicit. These have been instrumental in shaping the interpretations of 
behavior I shall be offering. 
(1) The agents we observe are experts, or near experts, at their tasks, despite 
these tasks often being everyday tasks. 
(2) Experts regularly find that enough information is available locally to make 
choices without having to plan on-line, using conscious analytical processes. 
(3) Experts help to ensure that they have enough information locally by 
partially &$ng or informationally structuring the environment as they go 
along. 
(4) The human environments of action we shall be examining, the equipment 
and surfaces that comprise each workspace, are pre-structured in important 
ways to help compensate for limitations in processing power and memory. 
Of these four tenets, number (3)-ways of informational structuring-will be 
my primary focus. It is worth elaborating numbers (2) and (4), as well, however, 
to get a proper perspective on this approach to embodied everyday activity. 
Readers who are impatient to see the classification of ways of using space 
intelligently may skip to Section 3. 
2. I. Experts don’t plan much 
The hallmark of expertise, from a behavioral standpoint, is effectiveness and 
robustness. The hallmark of expertise, from a theoretical standpoint, is sufficient 
compiled knowledge to cope with normal contingencies without much on-line 
planning. A major factor in this compilation is expert perception: having the right 
perceptual categories, and knowing how to keep an eye on salient properties [lo]. 
It is widely accepted that, for experts, there is tremendous local constraint on 
what should be done next [9]. Practice has tuned the perceptual systems of 
experts both to the microfeatures and cues that correlate with effective action 
[3,6,22,23], and to the conditions when it is most helpful to attend to those cues. 
Rasmussen [36,37] and Reason [38] have elaborated this viewpoint in some 
detail. On their account, once an expert has decided what his goals are-what to 
cook for dinner, for example-the majority of activity that follows will be under 
what they call, skill-bused and rule-bused control (see also [34,38,41]; cf. [l]). 
These control structures, it is thought, are extremely responsive to current 
environmental conditions. 
In the case of skills, this responsiveness i automatic and unreflective. When we 
make ourselves a cup of tea in our home kitchen, for example, we “auto- 
matically” comply with the orientation of faucet, kettle, cups, the water pressure, 
automatically retrieve the tea bag, milk, teapot, and so on. These actions are 
D. Kirsh I Artificial Intelligence 73 (1995) 31-68 37 
unreflective in the way habits are unreflective. That is, the actions are intentional, 
but not the product of deliberation. 
In the case of rules, this responsiveness is also largely unreflective and 
automatic, triggered by perceived state information, but a rule has been invoked 
because the agent is aware that something unanticipated has occurred, that 
skill-based behaviors are beginning to drive things off course, and that corrective 
measures need to be taken. Thus, the need for a rule-based response will be 
triggered by one of the attentional checks on behavior that are part of skill-based 
activity. Once a disruption is noticed, the corrective action to be performed is 
determined by a rule in one of the “problem-solving packets” an expert has. For 
example, in the course of serving tea if we discover a dirty spoon, in normal 
circumstances, we will unreflectively wipe it clean, or reach into the drawer for 
another, or do whatever is obvious to put the process back on track. Even routine 
activities in familiar environments constantly give rise to such simple problems.* 
For most of these problems, it is suggested [36,37] experts find sufficient cues in 
the situation to trigger a known rule without halting the activity in order to 
consciously and analytically take stock of the situation and reason or deliberate 
about a solution. 
Conscious analytical processing-deliberation, as I have been calling it-is 
required when things begin to get too far out of control to rely on existing packets 
of problem-solving rules to manage the process. Only then must the agent 
consider non-local facts and goals, in order to formulate a plan to bring things 
back on track, or to find a new path to the goal. Accordingly, most expert activity 
is non-deliberate and locally driven. 
2.2. Experts jig their environment 
There are two obvious techniques which experts can use to increase the 
percentage of time they spend operating in skill and rule-based modes. The first is 
to broaden the range of cases their skills and rules cover, thereby coping with 
more diverse and uncertain environments. The second is to build into those skills 
and rules an environmental dampening factor that tends to decrease the vari- 
ability of the environment. This is the force of tenet (3)-experts partially jig the 
environment as they go along. It is here that space becomes of paramount 
importance. Let me elaborate. 
A jig is a device for stabilizing a process: it is a mechanism for reducing the 
degrees of freedom of a target object. A vice is a jig, a table top can serve as a 
jig, but so can a “pick” in basketball, or the slides on a cabinet drawer which 
determine the direction of free movement, or compliance. Jigging is one way of 
preparing or structuring the environment. The more completely prepared an 
environment is, the easier it is to accomplish one’s task. 
We can draw a logical distinction between physically jigging an environment 
* Compare Agre’s notion of hassles in his AI lab working paper of the same name [2]. 
and informationally jigging it; although in practice the two often go together. The 
distinction is between planting information in the environment to reduce the 
perceived degrees of freedom, and planting physical impediments or constraints in 
the environment to reduce the physical degrees of freedom an agent actually has. 
At the simplest level, the difference is between cues and constraints. In 
informationally jigging an environment an agent will usually arrange items 
(consciously or sometimes unconsciously) to draw attention, to cue cognitive 
events or processes in himself or herself, or another agent. For instance, in 
supermarkets, store managers succeed in biasing consumer choice by having large 
displays of ‘specials’ at the head of isles, by putting up flashy signs, by expanding 
the length of store shelf devoted to certain brands, and the like. These tricks alter 
a shopper’s perceived choices, but do not actually restrict the range of physically 
possible actions. In physically jigging an environment, however, an agent arranges 
items (consciously or sometimes unconsciously) to physically constrain action. 
Thus, sticking a door jam under a door serves to constrain the physical freedom 
of an agent. If the agent can be counted on to notice the jam, then it can be relied 
on to serve as a cue, an informational jig, but there are many cases where the 
physical constraint goes unnoticed, and so acts as a physical jig alone. 
I shall be concerned primarily with ways of arranging items to informationally 
jig the environment. As suggested, these include a variety of cueing techniques, 
but are not confined to those. For instance, the set of actions perceived possible 
may be reduced by hiding or partially occluding objects. Pull-down menus that 
display only some of the options available in a situation, is one such example. 
Another is found in the practice of dieters who keep certain foods in the pantry 
and out of the fridge. to prevent snacking. Out of sight is out of mind. Here, 
arrangements serve to constrain rather than cue perception. 
Nonetheless. cueing is the key method of informationally structuring an 
environment. Agents “seed” the environment with attention-getting objects or 
structures. These can be harnessed to not only reduce perceived choice but to bias 
the order in which actions are undertaken. When I put a roll of film by the 
doorway, for example, I am using space to create a reminder’ to prevent me from 
just marching out the door without remembering my earlier intention to get the 
film developed today. Reminders usually rely on attention-getting elements to 
draw our notice.” For instance, contextually unusual features, such as a surprising 
color, or an unexpected sound or smell, will often prompt reflection; as will being 
in just the right place at the time to be useful in a task. Such features work 
because we have sufficient knowledge of our tasks and plans that when, in the 
’ Reminders are one of the strategies agents have for improving prospective memory. “Prospective 
memory includes remembering a plan of action (i.e. what to do) and also remembering to do it. In 
most cases. the planned action has to be performed at a specified time. or within some time limits, so 
prospective memory also involves remembering when to perform the act” [12, p. 241. 
’ A different strategy for building reminders relics on ” mentally linking the prospective task to another 
routine event or activity, like scheduling prospective phone calls for coffee-break time. or linking 
picking up the dry cleaning with going to work. so that one action cues another” 112, p. 281. 
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course of activity, we notice these felicitous events, or surprises, we are reminded 
of aspects of our tasks that must be performed. If successful, they capture our 
attention at the right time and alert us to opportunities we might have missed, or 
they reduce the likelihood of performing a so-called “double-capture slip”.5 These 
are slips arising from failure to notice a relevant choice, or a change in 
circumstances, with the effect that a “frequently done activity suddenly takes 
charge instead of (captures) the intended one” [35, p. 1071. 
Much of what I shall present in the following sections concerns ways of using 
spatial arrangements to informationally jig or structure the environment, and 
much of that focuses on ways of keeping attention properly directed. It is worth 
noting how environments that are dedicated to certain tasks already incorporate 
some of these ideas. This is the point of stressing tenet (4): that most task 
environments are pre-structured. 
2.3. Pre-structured environments 
Let us say that an environment E, is well designed for a particular task T, and a 
particular agent A endowed with skill S, and rules R, if, at every choice point, the 
environment provides sufficient physical and informational resources to locally 
determine A’s choices. On the one hand, this will require E to be rich in task 
useful physical structures, for instance, E ought to have tools and surfaces which 
make it simple to satisfy regularly recurring preconditions in T. Thus, for cooking, 
where many tasks involve chopping, cutting, or slicing, we find kitchens equipped 
with knives in convenient reach, and hard flat surfaces-two obvious precondi- 
tions for most cutting-like actions. On the other hand, a well designed environ- 
ment will also have to be rich in useful informational structures+ues and the 
like-to make it simple to cope with the cognitive demands of the task. 
For example, in most kitchens [4], there are also timers, thermometers, oven 
lights and, of course, temperature settings to help us to see where in the process 
we are, and what must be done next. These devices populate the world with 
readily available task-relevant properties. Lids rattle when pressure builds up, 
kettles whistle or turn off automatically. 
5 A double capture error occurs when attention is drawn to something other than the choice at hand, 
and consequently behavior is then captured by a strong habit. Some examples cited by Reason and 
Mycielska [39] and Reason [38] are: 
(a) “I intended to stop on the way to work to buy some shoes, but ‘woke up’ to find that I had 
driven right past.” 
(b) “I went into my room to change into something comfortable for the evening, and the next thing 
I knew I was getting into my pyjama trousers, as if to go to bed.” 
(c) “I decided to make pancakes for tea. Then I remembered we didn’t have any lemons, so I 
decided not to bother. Five minutes later, I started getting together the ingredients for pancakes 
having completely forgotten my change of mind.” 
In (a) inattention caused the agent to miss a choice point permitting the habit currently active to 
continue-strong-habit exclusion. In (b) inattention led to a missed choice point marking the branch 
point of two habits (i.e. the ‘what to wear’ choice point). In (c) forgetfulness, or inattention to the 
changed circumstances led the agent to revert to an earlier plan that had already been scrapped. 
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The distinction we introduced before between a purely informational jig or 
structure, and a purely physical structure, can be made more rigorous as follows. 
An action that structures the environment in a purely informational way achieves 
nothing that could not equally well be achieved by asking an oracle. This contrasts 
with actions that structure the environment physically, which reduce the physical 
complexity of a task by satisfying either preconditions or background conditions 
of actions. 
This is worth explaining. An oracle is a device that can answer in unit time any 
instance of a particular decision problem. We might ask an oracle “what should I 
do next, given my current situation and goals?” Or “What are the likely effects of 
performing this action in this context. 3” Or even “What is the current state of the 
environment?” If the question asked is well-posed, i.e. decidable, the oracle will 
“instantly” return the correct answer. Oracles save computation. But they cannot 
save physical execution. Oracles can’t slice or fry an egg; they never bring an 
agent physically closer to its goals. 
For instance, to return to our blocks world example earlier, imagine we are 
dealing with blocks in which each block is lettered on one face only. As before, 
the goal assigned to the planner is to build a stack in which the letters form two 
sequences SPACE MATTERS, but, this time, the letters can be in any orienta- 
tion. If not all the letters are visible, some of the blocks will have to be turned 
over before the stack can be built so that we know we are building the towers with 
the right ordering. These external epistemic actions6 would not be necessary if we 
had an oracle or a partner in a better position to tell us a block’s letter. The 
interesting thing is that the action of re-orienting a block does not satisfy any 
physical precondition of the goal.’ The goal, as specified, allows the agent to place 
blocks without concern for direction. Accordingly, such actions are pragmatically 
superfluous. They are broadly equivalent’ to placing an oracle in the environment 
which is able to remind us where each block is as soon as we ask (look). 
Self-adjusting data structures provide a more formal model of the benefits of 
informational structuring. A data structure is self adjusting if each time an 
element is inserted or deleted, the structure executes an adjustment routine which 
performs simple changes to maintain certain “nice” properties. For example, in 
many sorting problems where binary trees are used to store the elements, it is 
possible that, due to some sequence of insertions and deletions the tree will 
become thin and long. Although traversing such a tree in left hand traversal is a 
linear time procedure, the process of deciding where to place the next element- 
that is, constructing the tree-is quadratic. If, however, certain small local 
’ For an in-depth analysis of the notion of external epistemic actions see [25]. 
’ Unless, of course, the letter is printed on the top or bottom of a block, and the only way to expose 
the letter is by unstacking all the blocks above it. 
’ One important difference between an oracle and an environment that is appropriately informational- 
ly structured is that oracles provide answers in unit time whereas agents who must recover relevant 
information from an informationally structured environment may take considerably longer. This 
suggests that it is desirable to structure environments in ways that make relevant information most 
explicit. See [22]. 
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changes are made to the tree whenever an operation is performed on it, we can 
guarantee keeping the tree wide and short. By incorporating such a scheme into 
the construction phase of our tree sorting algorithm we can improve performance, 
yielding an O(N log N) algorithmP 
Now the idea of making local changes in a data structure as we go along in 
order to improve performance is very much like making small rearrangements to 
the position of objects in our workspace to help us to find objects, to highlight 
change, or to allow us to use more efficient or familiar techniques. Both cases, 
self-adjusting data structures and reorganizing of the workspace, would be otiose 
if we had an oracle to advise us on what we must do next, or on where a 
particular element is to be found. 
The implication is that rearrangements may be done just as much to make 
objects convenient mentally as to make them convenient physically. Restructuring 
often serves a cognitive function: to reduce the cost of visual search, to make it 
easier to notice, identify and remember items, and, of course, to simplify one’s 
representation of the task. 
2.4. A word about complexity analysis 
Although I have been arguing that the point of informationally structuring 
space is to reduce the time and memory requirements of cognition, the actual 
reduction in computation achieved by the various methods I shall discuss does 
not, in general, lend itself to meaningful quantitative estimation. 
For instance, from a classical information processing point of view, choice is the 
outcome of a heuristic search of options represented in a problem space. The 
problem space lays out decision points, feasible actions, and some fraction of the 
consequences of taking choices, and the agent relies on various heuristic methods 
to discover a goal path. The main ways to reduce the complexity of choice, then, 
are to revise the problem space so as to: 
(1) reduce the fan-out of actions represented as available (feasible) at decision 
points-i.e. reduce the average branching factor; 
(2) eliminate certain decision points-i.e. create a more abstract space with 
fewer nodes; 
(3) represent the task in a way that exposes previously unnoticed constraints- 
i.e. add descriptions of state that lend themselves to better heuristic search, 
or, as in the mutilated checkerboard, to analytic solution. 
Other ways of reducing the complexity of choice are to: 
(4) improve search knowledge through chunking, caching, and so on; 
(5) speed up the creation of a problem space representation; 
9 Tarjan has made an effort to quantify the value of self adjusting data structures under the rubric of 
amortized computation. His analysis relies on a cost-benefit evaluation: if the average expected 
benefit of having a data structure with nice properties exceeds the average cost of putting it into that 
form the self-adjusting algorithm is worth the effort. See especially [46]. 
(6) speed up the actual low level computation of search and heuristic evalua- 
tion. 
Working within such a framework, it ought to be possible to determine, for any 
given problem, what is the expected computational savings of an improvement in 
one of these ways. Because there are external counterparts to most of these ways 
we would expect it possible to generate similar complexity analyses. It should not 
matter whether the change in the agent’s computational task comes from 
modifying the world to simplify choice, or modifying the internal representation 
of the world to simplify choice. Yet, in practice, complexity analyses have limited 
significance. 
For instance. in Fig. 2(a) we see a graphical representation of the value of 
having heuristics. Theoretically, an agent who modifies the description of state to 
allow application of a heuristic powerful enough to single out a unique action at 
each choice point, can reduce the complexity of search exponentially, from 6” to 
n, where II is the average depth to the goal node and b is the average branching 
factor. The agent can just choose the best action at each choice point without 
checking for downstream consequences. Yet how many agents actually search 
through all the steps in a plan before choosing the first step? 
The external counterpart to method 3-modifying the description of problem 
state-is to add new “heuristic cues” to the workplace. For example, in the 
salad-making case mentioned in the introduction, we might argue that lining up 
the vegetables not only helped determine the value of the cue “relative number 
remaining”, it altered the environment so that the heuristic based on it was now 
usable. To realistically calculate the savings of such a cue, however, we would like 
a cost-benefit analysis comparing the time lost by physically lining up the items, 
versus the savings in improved layout performance. Empirical experiments can be 
A. B. C. 
Fig. 7. In these three graphs WC see different ways a problem space can bc modified to reduce search. 
In (a). the information available at each node (which is not visible in this picture), has been 
supplemented so that there is enough explicit information available locally to choose, on heuristic 
grounds, a unique preferred action at each decision point. With the right heuristic cue a hard problem 
can be made easy. In (b), the problem space has been set up so that the agent does not even represent 
some of the feasible actions. In (c). we see the effects of revising the problem space to completely 
eliminate the need for certain decisions. (c) is an abstraction from (a), in this case it is a sub-graph of 
(a). External counterparts to each of these methods exist. To cause (a) by external means we modify 
the environment so that there are heuristic cues available (e.g. lining up the vegetables). To cause (b). 
we alter the environment so that actions are no longer locally afforded by the situation. Hiding food in 
the pantry is a trivial example. To cause (c), we change the setting so that it is impossible to reach 
certain decision points. For instance, locking the door to the kitchen to completely eliminate the 
choice of a midnight snack. In actual cases. we often find varying degrees of each of these effects 
present at once. 
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done. But these hardly count as formal results. They certainly will not tell us 
much about the internal computation saved, since different agents who use 
different methods will have tricks and shortcuts too, thereby frustrating appealing 
to empirical findings for worst case results. What is interesting about the 
examples, then, is not how much they reduce computation-for that we cannot 
meaningfully estimate-but how easily they reduce it. 
3. Using space to simplify choice 
3.1. Cues and constraints 
Prima facie, choice is the product of search-visual search for the actions that 
are currently available, and mental search of the desirability of those available 
actions. Arrangements which reduce either type of search, simplify the computa- 
tional burden of agents. In Fig. 2 there is a graph-theoretic portrait of three ways 
search can be so reduced. Information via cues and constraints can be added to a 
problem in order to: 
(1) reduce the average fan-out of actions perceived as available at decision 
points; 
(2) eliminate the need for previously necessary decisions; 
(3) add new heuristic properties to simplify ranking the desirability of actions. 
We will discuss each in turn. 
3.2. Reducing perceived actions 
To see an action as available for choice is to notice that it is afforded by the 
current situation. An affordance of a situation, crudely stated, is a way that a 
situation lends itself to being used [15]. An empty container affords filling, an 
active television affords viewing, and a hammer affords striking. Because of the 
relational nature of affordances, we need to tie them to the action repertoire of an 
agent. A television does not afford viewing to a blind person; a hammer does not 
afford hitting to a creature without manipulators. A situation has an affordance 
for a particular agent. Moreover, we can change the affordances of an object 
merely by altering its context. A television does not afford viewing when enclosed 
in a box; a cup does not afford filling in a liquidless environment. An affordance, 
as we shall use the term then, is a dispositional property of a situation defined by 
a set of objects organized in a set arrangement, relativized to the action repertoire 
of a given agent. Agents perceive an affordance, when they register that one of 
their possible actions is feasible in a situation. 
Because an agent need not register all the actions feasible in a situation, the 
action set which is perceived as feasible (the perceived action set) is sensitive to 
properties of the situation, particularly arrangement. Two general ways of biasing 
the perceived action set are by: 
(1) hiding affordances-construining what is seen as feasible; 
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(2) highlighting affordances-cueing attention to what is feasible. 
Clever placements do both, often at once. 
Case 1: Production lines hide affordances 
Production lines have been around since long before Henry Ford. Every time 
we serially decompose a complex task by dividing the space in which it is 
performed into functional stations where specific subtasks are performed, we 
create a production line. Of course, Ford added the notion of pipe-lining. But the 
principle is the same: by regionalizing subtasks we restrict the kind of actions an 
agent will consider undertaking. Only certain inputs find their way into each 
region, only certain tools are present, and so only certain actions are afforded. We 
may think of each spatial region as creating a task context, or task frame in which 
only certain skills and rules are appropriate. This has the effect of decreasing the 
fan-out of perceived options and eliminates the need to memorize anything more 
than the most abstract steps in a plan. 
For example, in my kitchen at home, a task as simple as preparing a plain 
garden salad, reveals a latent production line because I wash vegetables by the 
sink and cut them on a chopping board. More precisely, 
I gather all the vegetables 1 intend to use, and place them beside the sink. As 
each vegetable is washed 1 place it aside, separating it from the unwashed 
vegetables. When all are washed I transfer them to beside the cutting board, 
where I keep my knives, and begin chopping each in the way I will need it. 
When we examine this task we note two uses of space: 
(1) by dividing the space by the sink into two, I segregate the vegetables by 
their cleanliness-a limiting case (binary) of using space to simplify 
classification. More on this in Section 4. 
(2) by dividing the room into stations, where only certain subtasks are 
performed, I restrict the range of possible actions I consider at each station 
to a small subset of the possible actions that can in principle be performed 
on each ingredient. 
The equipment and surfaces of a station effectively trigger an action frame or 
task context in which only a fraction of all actions are considered. Once a context 
of action has been triggered, the local affordances make clear what can and must 
be done. If a tomato were viewed in isolation, a cook in search of a salad might 
consider chopping it, washing it, placing it directly in a salad bowl or plate, or 
even eating it on the spot. To perform most of these tasks the cook would have to 
first find the relevant equipment-knives, sink, bowl, etc. Exactly which task the 
cook would do would depend on where in the plan he was. The virtue of spatially 
decomposing the task is that one need not consult a plan, except at the very 
highest level, to know what to do. Each task context affords only certain 
possibilities for action. You don’t think of washing vegetables when they are 
sitting beside a knife and a cutting board, unless their unwashed state stands out 
and alerts you to a problem. Similarly, if an item is unwet and beside the sink, for 
all intents and purposes, it carries a “wash me” label. A cook entering the room 
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can read off what is to be done, for there is enough information available in the 
set-up. The reason production line layouts are examples of hiding affordances 
rather than highlighting affordances is that the context of action delimits the range 
of immediately available actions to the ones that are “ready to go”. When a knife 
and board are present, cutting actions are ready to go, and washing is not. (See 
Fig. 3). - 
Case 2: Cueing blocked actions 
Manufacturing production lines often prevent workers from moving around to 
where tools are kept, create a set of dedicated workers. Actions are therefore not 
merely out of mind, they are out of bounds. In household kitchens, though, the 
same person does many tasks; stations are not fixed and tools move around. This 
means that although we have action frames, or task contexts, which have the 
effect of dropping from our sight certain actions that are still available in 
principle, we aren’t physically or socially unable to perform those out of context 
actions. Such actions become impossible only when something in the environment 
restricts the physical freedom of the agent. For instance, by putting a door jam 
under a swing door one of the directions of opening can be blocked. One is free 
to open the door, but not to open it in the blocked direction. That action is 
physically unavailable. This practice of changing the task environment to 
eliminate degrees of freedom we call blocking. 
Blocking usually restricts affordances by changing the action context so that 
certain preconditions are clobbered. This is seldom a permanent change-the 
door jam can be removed. But often the change is meant to be noticed; it signals 
the fact that a precondition has been intentionally clobbered. Some spatial 
arrangements ay “Don’t do X”. They cue a prohibition. Here is an example. 
I I I 
Fig. 3. In this figure we see a typical kitchen with its stations for chopping, using the burners, baking, 
and cleaning up. In professional kitchens separate staff may operate these stations, but in household 
kitchens, the same agent moves from station to station, often carrying tools along as he or she moves. 
The equipment and surfaces of a station effectively trigger an action frame or task context in which 
only a fraction of all actions are “live” options. This reduces the complexity of choice by creating a 
production line. A production line works successfully when a global task can be spatially decomposed 
into subtasks where the output of each subtask is a suitable input to the next subtask. This has the 
effect of decreasing the fan-out of perceived options, and eliminates the need to memorize a plan. 
46 I>. Kirsh i Artificial lntelligrncr 7.3 (1995) 31-68 
In physical plants, engineers regularly leave rags on hot handles or pipes to 
prevent burns. By placing a functionally significant item in a functionally 
significant place, the engineer creates a reminder or warning for himself and 
others. 
Here is a second example: 
One hassle notorious to owners of garbage disposal units is that it is easy for 
an implement, a knife or spoon, to slip into the machine’s belly without one’s 
knowledge. The next time the device is turned on the piece is mangled. To 
prevent this, a standard ploy is to cover the mouth with a plug, or failing 
that, to throw refuse into the mouth of the unit before placing cutlery in the 
same sink. The mouth is thereby blocked before implements can be 
swallowed up. 
As is obvious from the examples, the physical context has not been irreversibly 
changed. An agent could undo a blocked precondition, in the same way that an 
agent could take a knife out of the drawer to cut a tomato. But, the distinction 
present is that a rag on a pipe, or a plug in a sink, are not just physical 
impediments to action; in most cases, they are intentional, meaningful cues. A 
visible wedge, a clamp, a boot on a car. a club on the steering wheel, a blockade, 
are further cases where knowledge of how a device functions can be counted on to 
make these physical impediments salient. In principle, any easy to notice 
clobbered precondition can be harnessed to signify that a particular path is 
obstructed, irregular, contaminated, or otherwise blocked. But the most reliable 
will rely on “natural mappings” [35] and will themselves satisfy the psychological 
conditions of being good cues. Thus, the absence of a knife is a less good cue than 
the presence of a pair of oven mits. That being said, a convention can be set up 
whereby almost any arrangement can be called into service to signal prohibition. 
For instance, a completely set table marks its being prepared for something 
special: other activities that are regularly performed on tables, such as writing, 
drinking tea, etc.. are outlawed. 
Case 3: Arrangements that draw attention to affordances 
We have seen two ways of reducing an agent’s perceived option set by 
structuring the workplace. The first eliminates actions from the perceived set by 
reducing affordances so that certain actions are not perceived as locally available, 
the second eliminates certain actions from consideration by prohibiting them-by 
creating cues that carry the message don’t do that. Examples of arrangements 
created to steal attention-to highlight affordances-are not as straightforward. 
But they are prevalent. 
We can distinguish two sorts: 
(1) arrangements that highlight the obvious thing to do; 
(2) arrangements that highlight opportunistic things to do. 
The difference between the two turns on how habitual the action is that is cued. 
For instance, at the check-out counter of supermarkets the person bagging 
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groceries operates in a strongly skill-driven manner. Owing to their accumulated 
knowledge about the items that must be packed, and the space available for 
buffering, baggers build up regular ways of solving their bin-packing problems. 
Among their other tricks, they rely on arrangements in the buffer zone to help 
call attention to obvious properties of the inventory. 
In bagging groceries the simple rules of practice are to put large heavy items 
at the bottom, more fragile items on the top, intermediate items go wherever 
they will fit. The flow of goods being cashed through, however, seldom 
matches the moment-by-moment requirements of packing. So the bagger is 
forced to buffer goods. Better baggers begin to create side pockets of goods 
in the buffer zone: thin fragile items, such as eggs or fresh pasta; items that 
must remain upright, such as raspberries, or a slice of cake, or firm 
cushioning items, such as magazines. Neither the choice of categories for 
clustering nor the location of these pockets is arbitrary. From informal 
observation it is evident that certain classifications are standard and that 
items in closer pockets are more likely to be used sooner. 
Grocery packing is a complex interactive process in which control oscillates 
between being internally goal directed-“1 need an intermediate object now”- 
and being feedback or data controlled-“can’t I put this item in one of the bags 
I’ve started already ?” By partitioning the space into identifiable clusters-“1 need 
a heavy object-there’s a bunch by the register”-the agent reduces the 
complexity of choice. This works in several ways. First, by creating equivalence 
classes of items, heavy, intermediate, fragile, small, the bagger makes it easier to 
spot a sought after type of item, and also easier to grab an item of that kind in a 
hurry. Three small items clustered together make it easier both to remember and 
to see where a small item is. Second, the urgency with which an item of a certain 
kind need be packed correlates nicely with the size of its build-up in the buffer 
zone. Because size is an attention-getting feature, the largest pile cries out for 
early use. This has the salutary effect that the agent is less likely to forget items in 
larger piles, and so, other things being equal, is more likely to use an item from 
that pile next. Third, items nearer to the center of the workplace are more likely 
to get noticed as vision sweeps over them in the normal course of packing. Hence, 
other things equal, they too have a greater likelihood of being used. It is not 
surprising that on questioning, baggers admit to often reserving that space for 
items they intend to use immediately after the next item. In each case, then, 
placement of items serves to highlight particular features that are useful. 
Clustering highlights the functional category of items; size highlights urgency; and 
centrality highlights what is next to be used. Each highlighted feature helps to bias 
choice. 
The second class of attention-related biases relies on setting up the environment 
to increase the chance of noticing regularly unnoticed possibilities-of seeding 
opportunities (see Fig. 4). It is remarkably prevalent. Almost every activity 
produces by-products and side effects, some of which can be re-used. For 
instance, in repairing an old car the nuts and bolts removed when replacing a 
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Fig. 3. A typical check-out scene in a supermarket reveals seeding the space around one with 
attention-getting clusters of goods. Skilled baggers build buffer zones that collect as yet unpacked 
items in functional groups such as fragile, heavy, keep upright. The groups of items that are nearby 
are likely to be used sooner than items more distant. The purpose of the groupings appears to be that 
of enhancing the affordances of the items. Thus heavy items afford support, hard items afford 
protection and so on. As baggers learn how to buffer and manage the space around the register better 
they begin to pack faster and more effectively. Not only do they have what they need more at hand, 
they can see what they have and so simplify choice. 
worn out part are rarely thrown out immediately because they may prove useful 
later in bolting the new part in place, or in other repairs. “Don’t throw out what 
might be useful” is a conservative but rational policy. Yet there is a trade-off. The 
more that is retained the more cluttered the space, with the result that the very 
opportunities that might be found go unnoticed. How do agents manage tusk 
detritus ? 
The principle behind clever by-product management is to leave around 
whatever has a good chance of promoting opportunism. Opportunism is the 
practice of taking advantage of opportunities the environment provides in order 
to fulfill a goal one did not originally set out to attain-the opportunistic goal lies 
outside one’s current sub-goal context. Moreover, it is important that the cost to 
attain the opportunistic goal is lower than normal-the context provides the agent 
with a golden opportunity.‘” 
A simple example of cultivated opportunism is found in the practice of 
carpenters: 
“’ For example, I set out to go to the supermarket to buy dinner and note that the cleaners is nearby. 
In stopping to pick up the cleaning, I am satisfying a goal that I did not originally intend. But the 
environment provides me with an opportunity, which if noticed, can be exploited at less cost than 
satisfying the goal from scratch. I can piggyback the opportunistic goal and save the cost of a second 
trip. 
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In the course of making a piece of furniture one periodically tidies up. But 
not completely. Small pieces of wood are pushed into a corner or left about; 
tools, screwdrivers and mallets are kept nearby. The reason most often 
reported is that “they come in handy”. Scraps of wood can serve to protect 
surfaces from marring when clamped, hammered or put under pressure. They 
can elevate a piece when being lacquered to prevent sticking. The list goes 
on. 
By wisely leaving around a certain clutter, an agent multiplies the chances of 
getting something for nothing. But not just anywhere will do. The most successful 
ways of seeding the environment seem to require placing objects in positions 
which have the greatest chance of displaying their @ordunces. This is not always 
easy, for given the number of affordances an object has, it seems to require 
knowing which affordances are going to be useful, when they are going to be 
useful, and how to lay them about to call attention to just those affordances. 
Thus, the problem of facilitating opportunism is to find a way of leaving 
equipment, intermediate products, and task detritus around the workplace to 
highlight particular affordances. 
If the agent has a system for placing objects-“1 always keep the useful scraps 
over there”-their affordance will be known. But equally, if clusters of objects, 
organized by affordance, are built on the fly the agent also has a better chance of 
noticing opportunities. A clear example shows up in flower arranging: 
In flower arranging it is customary to leave around discarded by-products, 
such as twigs and ferns, on the off-chance that they will prove useful in 
striking on a felicitous design. Pieces that seem most likely to be helpful are 
kept closer. Spatial layout partitions by-products into categories of possible 
use. 
In general, cueing attention to bias choice is a hit or miss affair. But, given a 
clear understanding of what cues stand out, and how agents can encode 
meaningful pointers out of them, we might hope to build systems for exploiting 
cues to reduce task complexity. 
3.3. Eliminating decisions 
Let us say that a decision has been eliminated altogether if an agent has no 
choices to make when at that state. A state may be at the meeting place of several 
actions fanning in, or there may be only one previous state leading to it. In either 
case, if a state has no fanout, we shall say that it no longer marks a decision point. 
(See Fig. 5). 
Good designers are forever looking for ways of contracting the number of 
decisions users must make: not just in the number of actions they must consider at 
any point but in the number of times they must make a decision at all. The fewer 
degrees of freedom an agent has the simpler its task, providing of course that the 
outcome is what the agent wants. Ultimate simplicity comes when there is only 
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Fig. 5. The collapsed graph first shown in Fig. 2(c) shows us two types of eliminated decision points. 
In the first, at f; two paths that once were available have been eliminated so that the agent now has no 
alternative to moving along the one path available. In the second type, at g, h. i. j ,k. the agent again 
has no alternative, so in effect, behavior is determined from f onward. 
one degree of freedom, or, more realistically, many degrees at the outset of a 
task, but then after that none: the outcome is ballistically determined. It is forced. 
Most examples of informationally forced choices are limiting cases of blocking, 
narrowed action contexts, or attention stealing. Here is a different case that shows 
how properties of our three-dimensional topology can be exploited to simplify a 
problem, and so, in effect, do away with earlier choice points. 
A familiar problem faced by tailors is to reliably measure and record on cloth 
the given pattern they are to cut. The standard method is to first make a 
paper mock-up then trace the image right through the paper onto the 
material. In most cases the left pattern can be created simply by turning over 
the right pattern. 
The key technique in eliminating decisions shown here is to substitute 
compliance for choice. Once the tailor has laid out the tracing paper, the rest is 
ballistic. There is no need to make moment-by-moment decisions about where to 
position the scissors: they are to follow the chalked line. Nor, for that matter, is it 
necessary to explicitly calculate the mirror image paper mock-up. The simple flip 
transform achieves that. By exploiting topological properties of the action space. 
certain otherwise key decision steps in trouser construction have been designed 
out of the process. The layout and cutout process are now so streamlined, and 
constrained. that there is no real choice. 
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3.4. Offloading heuristic properties 
The third, and final way of using space to simplify choice is by creating 
arrangements that serve as heuristic cues that indicate the desirability of actions. 
Let us understand a heuristic property to be an easily computed property of a 
local situation which allows us to rank the desirability of available actions. In 
rational decision theory, heuristics (or case knowledge) are supposed to serve as a 
plausibility filter, to be activated after a filter for availability has been applied 
[14]. Heuristic information is supposed to explain how live options can be ranked 
on the basis of local information. The distinction between this type of local 
information and the type of local information available in cues that prohibit, draw 
attention, or remind, is not hard and fast, but can be made by examining the 
scope of the information. A heuristic cue, unlike a plug left in a drain, normally 
applies to many choice points. For instance, in lining vegetables up into rows, our 
salad maker created a heuristic cue that was meant to apply repeatedly to 
decisions over the course of the task. It was a way of setting up the world to key 
into the skills of the agent over the long haul. Accordingly, the set-up costs could 
be amortized over the whole task. By contrast, in leaving a plug in the sink, or in 
placing the next item to be bagged close by, the cost of set-up must be paid off by 
the savings in the next few actions. 
Case 4: Encoding the temporal order of actions 
One of the most obvious and compelling ways of using space-and judging by 
conversation, the one most likely to leap to mind-is to lay down items for 
assembly, in the order in which they are to be put together, touched, handed off, 
or otherwise used. Space naturally encodes linear orders, and higher orders if the 
agent has an encoding system in mind. The obvious virtue of encoding orderings 
in the world is to offload memory. If I can arrange items to display the sequence 
they are are to be used in, then I don’t have to remember that order, or figure it 
out, or consult the manual, as long as I know how to read the information off the 
local properties of the world. 
Let us view an assembly problem as having two components: the selection 
problem-which piece is the one to attach next; and the placement problem- 
where and in what orientation should it be attached. 
Here is an example of arranging pieces to simplify the selection problem: 
Imagine repairing an alternator. One takes the device apart, checks each 
piece, replaces the defective ones, cleans the old but usable pieces, and 
re-assembles the lot. In an untrafficked workplace, it is easy to create a 
geometrically simple spatial ordering that allows the property next position in 
the arrangement o be read off trivially. For instance, if the items are laid out 
in a straight line, interpretation of next is effortless. It is then trivial to decide 
that the next piece in the line is the next piece to use. But in busier 
workplaces and for harder assemblies, the orderings will often be more 
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baroque: sub-assemblies may be segregated into groups but left unordered 
within that. nuts and bolts may be put in small containers, larger pieces kept 
nearby, and so on. Determining the next piece to use, in such cases, may not 
be so simple. 
Computationally, the advantage of having an ordering is obvious. In the extreme 
case, we reduce a doubly exponential problem of deciding which piece to select 
and where to place it, into an exponential problem. To see this, suppose the 
placement problem is regular: that at any moment there are two possible places a 
piece can fit, front or back of the assembly. If the agent knows the right ordering, 
and hence has a solution to the selection problem, then since there are two 
possible placements for each piece in an arrangement, there are, in the worst 
case, 2” possibilites to search through. If the agent must solve both the selection 
and placement problems simultaneously, then all n factorial permutations of 
placements must be considered, generating 0(22”) possibilities to test. In the 
felicitous case, where the assembly forces a unique placement, and there is only 
one place a piece can fit at any moment, then given the right ordering the 
assembly problem is constant time. By contrast, if the agent must find an 
ordering, the problem is 0(n2) even when the assembly forces a unique 
placement, because at each step the agent must try out the remaining pieces. 
The trick in using space to encode placement order is obviously to have an 
ordering that is easy to read off an arrangement. Intuitively, linear orderings are 
just such an arrangement; they have a natural meaning for next. Moreover, 
arranging parts linearly, has the added virtue that it is hard to misplace items. If 
all parts are in a line, you know where to look. No surprise, then, that straight 
line orders are commonplace. But there is a danger, too, in using linear orders: 
the longer the line of pieces, the more likely the pieces are to be kicked out of 
order. Consequently, for the sake of robustness, assemblies involving many parts 
are better placed in a compact group. And indeed anecdotal reports suggest hat 
small groups are popular: bolts and nuts clustered together, sub-assemblies off to 
a side. Furthermore, a simple linear order is not an expressive enough structure to 
carry information of the form: build sub-assemblies one and two first, then 
assemble those sub-assemblies, then assemble sub-assemblies three and four. (See 
Fig. 6.) 
As arrangements become more complex, however, they lose much of their 
naturalness of interpretation, and depend more on an agent’s ability to remember 
how things were laid out at set-up time. Memory for location is a current topic of 
psychological inquiry. In an early discussion of this topic, Malone [33] provided 
anecdotal evidence that subjects are surprisingly apt at locating documents in 
their office space. This was thought to reveal hidden virtues in messy desks, for 
the messier the desk, the more categories and cross-references one can achieve- 
at least, in principle. In a more recent study of locational recall, though, Lansdale 
127, p. 11721 suggests that a subject’s ability to recall the location of an object-a 
computer icon in an array-is disappointing in comparison to Malone’s anecdotal 
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Fig. 6. In many assembly tasks it is necessary to complete sub-assemblies before all parts can be put 
together. A simple trick some repair people use is to cluster sub-assemblies in groups, themselves 
possibly strictly ordered, and to arrange the groups in ways that reflect the global order of assembly. 
Here we see a sub-assembly represented by a depression in a simple linear ordering. 
evidence .ll The reason the subjects themselves most often offered for their poor 
performance-as revealed by their most frequent complaint during the experi- 
ment-was that “different locations were arbitrary: there was no meaning to 
them, and hence the encoding of locational information was an abstract process” 
[27, p. 11741. Further experiments which allowed subjects to exploit an encoding 
strategy-a method of location assignment hat made sense with respect to the 
objects they were storing-showed that having a preexisting system was tremen- 
dously helpful. 
Now, if linear orders are insufficiently expressive, agents must rely on known 
systems of arrangement, or on some design that makes sense relative to the 
subject matter. For instance, in organizing icons in a Macintosh style environ- 
ment, it would not be surprising if users arranged their icons for “peripheral” 
equipment, such as hard and soft disks, printer, waste basket, fax machine, 
remote terminal, around the physical periphery of the screen, and in a way that 
would make sense if the screen were their office and the equipment distributed 
around the walls. The semantics is clear here. Hence it is relatively easy to 
remember where a given icon is to be found. But it is less easy to find a system 
that conveys what piece to take next that does not rely on some perceptual cue, 
such as next biggest, next in line. It is possible to make the system more complex 
by incorporating a procedure of choice, such as, if one needs a hex bolt, then use 
the one at the end of the hex bolt line. whereas if one needs a washer use the 
I’ Whether this low success rate is due to subjects not having themselves determined the shape or size 
of the matrix, or to the fact that subjects do not pick up locational information just by handling objects 
is still unknown. 
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left. But at some point. as the visual search involved in 
becomes more complex, the virtue of structuring items is 
Case 5: Encoding where to place it 
In assembly tasks we distinguished the selection problem from the placement 
problem. Arrangements that help solve the selection problem reduce the search 
space by encoding the property next piece to use in an easy to read off manner. 
Position in the spatial arrangement marks position in assembly sequence, so the 
simple heuristic: use the next piece, is a reliable guide to action. The fact that 
more expert agents can encode orderings in non-linear and not immediately 
obvious arrangements proves only that they operate with sophisticated categories, 
not that they cannot determine next in a trivial way. 
It would be attractive if a simple, or tractable, arrangement could be found that 
solves both the selection and placement problems. For instance, one might try to 
place the pieces on the floor in a manner that reveals where they go in the 
growing assemblage, but in a way that also encodes next. Unfortunately there is 
more information than can be encoded naturally” in two dimensions. 
Consider the case of assembling a desk: 
In assembling a desk, standard practice is to arrange the key parts-the top, 
the right and left sides, the important struts-beside each other on the floor 
in a manner that reflects the way they will be put together. But temporal and 
topological structure pull apart, because it is hard to see how one can read 
which part to use next from the layout. For instance. if there is drilling to be 
done, it may be done on each piece before any two are joined. If there are 
intermediate steps which need be done before assembling the large pieces- 
such as attaching physical connectors, sanding edges, and so forth-the 
spatial display neither prohibits nor promotes that temporal ordering. 
What should be apparent from this example is that as assemblages become 
more complicated it becomes harder to read next off the arrangement. This is not 
the same problem we discussed under non-linear orderings, above. The problem, 
now, is that if we lay out pieces in a way which encodes information about 
topological structure, we severely constrain the ways that remain for encoding 
sequence. As mentioned, it helps to have a systematic method of arranging items 
in mind beforehand. But, even so, the combinatorics are unbeatable. There is no 
escaping the fact that complex topologies will evade description in 2D layouts, 
” By natural, in this case, I mean that there is a non ad hoc arrangement that an agent can call on to 
deal with the multi-dimensional problem of specifying when and where. Much of the problem lies in 
specifying where. Given a device with a multi-dimensional topology. it is extremely difficult to specify 
where an arbitrary part ought to be placed without using a general language with referential capacity 
to identify the pieces it touches. Consider the limitations in identifying the connectivity of a large cube 
made of smaller cubes. If the center cube touches cubes on all of its six sides there is no way of 
analogically representing that connectivity in 2D except in terms of a graph structure with labeled 
nodes. 
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and no escaping that even with simple topologies there will be occasions when the 
next piece to assemble lies on the other side of the floor, with no obvious spatial 
reason for assuming it to be the next piece. 
There are a few ways of viewing topological encodings. The most interesting, in 
my opinion, sees them as the data set for a simple assemblage program. Observe 
Fig. 7(a). Suppose an agent is told “fold each piece 90” and connect it with screws 
to the pieces it touches”. The layout on the floor is the data to this program. If 
the layout is properly set up, the three-dimensional connectivity will follow as a 
consequence of applying the program. The agent needn’t review mentally the 
results of applying the program, any more than he would in using a set of 
compasses to draw a circle. If certain background conditions are correct-in the 
case of the compasses, that the paper is flat, in the case of the desk, that the 
layout folds correctly, then the algorithm will deliver the right answer given the 
data. 
Now analytically a data set constitutes constraints on the output of a program. 
If the program is simple and the data set complex, the intelligence-the 
constraint-lies primarily in the data. This is the key idea behind logic program- 
ming. If, on the other hand, the data are simple and the program complex, the 
intelligence lies primarily in the program. This is the key idea behind standard 
procedural programming. 
One technique expert assemblers learn is how to “logic program” with the 
environment. They learn to put into the spatial arrangement enough information 
2 
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Fig. 7. In (a) we see a typical layout map for preparing the workspace to make assembly of a desk 
easy. The agent is advised to lay the parts down on the floor before assembly begins. The physical 
layout serves as input to a simple assembly program. By contrast, in (b) we see an alternative map that 
labels edges explicitly and explicitly states connectivity. Figuring out how to lay the assembly on the 
floor is itself a problem. So pieces tend to be labeled and stored in a pile. This leads to more visual 
search during assembly and more computation to ensure the right edges are connected. Not 
surprisingly, informal reports indicate that instructions that rely on matching numbers and edges prove 
to be harder in practice to follow. 
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to use a simple procedure to complete the task. There is no reason this 
arrangement may not be planned out beforehand. Indeed it often is. But the point 
is that expert assemblers can multiply the speed of on-line assembly if they lay out 
the parts well, as well as reduce the probability of error. (See Fig. 7.) 
4. Spatial arrangements that simplify perception 
In each of the examples just discussed the agent’s decision problem was made 
com6inatorially less complex by information that could be read off from the 
environment. One way or another, the amount of internal search required for 
choosing an action was reduced. A second fundamental way the problem of 
choosing an action can be simplified is by re-organizing arrangements to facilitate 
perception: to make it possible to notice properties or categories that were not 
noticed before, to make it easier to find relevant items, to make it easier for the 
visual system to track items. 
Typically, in accounts of decision making, the cost of perception does not figure 
significantly in the combinatorics of choice. The cost of determining whether a 
perceptual operator applies to a world state or not, is assumed to have no effect 
on the size of the subgraph that must be searched, because search size is a 
function of the depth and breadth of a search, not how long it takes to identify a 
state, or test an operator. Hence, perceptual costs are treated as, at worst, 
contributing a constant increase in the complexity of a problem, they may 
increase the cost of a search from bd to a(b”). 
In absolute time, as opposed to asymptotic time, however, if there is a way to 
more readily determine the action affordances at a choice point, or the ap- 
plicability of a heuristic, the agent will have more time to make a choice. Any 
change which makes recognition faster certainly simplifies the psychological 
hardness of a problem. 
4.1. Clustering to categorize 
Perhaps the most obvious way of simplifying perception is to arrange objects in 
space so that they form equivalence classes, or partitions, that reflect relevant 
preconditions, or properties that are useful to track, notice, or exploit. For 
instance, a standard precondition for washing a salad ingredient-a tomato-is 
that it has not already been washed. Clean and dirty tomatoes can be hard to tell 
apart. So one common ploy is to place washed tomatoes in one place, unwashed 
tomatoes in another. By segregating the two groups we highlight their differences. 
Examples of other objects already mentioned as being useful to classify include 
the side groups in the buffer region of checkout counters, scraps of wood in 
workshops, and playing cards which are usually ordered by suit and number in 
bridge, and by scoring category in gin rummy. 
The primary value of such external partitioning is that it makes it easier: 
l to keep track of where things are; 
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l to notice their relevant affordances. 
Both factors are involved in recognizing the availability of actions and in 
monitoring the current state. If I can’t find the garlic, I am not likely to think of 
rubbing it on the salad bowl-1 miss some available actions. And, if I can’t tell 
whether the dishes are clean or dirty-i.e. I fail to monitor correctly-then I can’t 
decide whether I should wash them. 
Clustering helps solve these problems because it is harder to lose big things 
than little ones, and harder to miss seeing what a whole group is good for. For 
instance, memory for location, as was mentioned before, is regularly overesti- 
mated. It is harder to remember where a pen is, than its color. But if the pen is in 
the group of like colored objects, the sheer size of the colored group will simplify 
the visual search problem. Color can be used as both a memory aid and a visual 
cue. 
A similar story holds for affordances. The fact that a group of heavy glass 
bottles is building up by the cash register highlights the fact that heavy items are 
available. As merchandisers well know, one way to increase the chance of being 
noticed is to occupy more space-make bigger displays. The same method is used 
every day to simplify noticing affordances. 
4.2. Other techniques for creating categories 
Clustering is only one of the ways agents have of creating equivalence classes 
on the fly. According to Gestalt theory other factors besides proximity which 
determine whether we perceive a set of items as a group are such things as how 
similar the items are (similarity), whether the items move together (common 
fate), whether they fit into a smooth, continuous line (good continuation), 
whether they can be seen as a closed form, and whether they stand out together 
against a background (surroundedness). We have already seen examples of several 
of these. Good continuation, for instance, is relied on by assemblers to distinguish 
parts in their assembly plan from random parts in the workshop. Similarity is used 
by baggers working in tight spaces where large heavy items, though clustered, are 
directly beside small items.13 An example of surroundedness was supplied by one 
reviewer of this paper. He mentioned that his father taught him to place the 
various pieces of his dismantled bicycle, many of which were small, on a sheet of 
newspaper. The newspaper served to mark out a region that was to be treated as 
special; it demarcated a boundary within which items of a particular sort were to 
be placed. Hence, it was easy to locate them, and they were less likely to be 
kicked about. 
The idea of creating a special region applies not only to cases where there is a 
visible frame, a newspaper for instance, but to notional regions that an agent sets 
aside. By creating such regions it is sometimes possible to achieve tasks which 
l3 Because common fate is a dynamic property we leave it for another time. 
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might otherwise be impossible. An interesting example can be found, once again, 
in the blocks world. 
David Chapman [8] argued that it is possible to use a Pengi-like system to build 
a nine-block tower-spelling FRUITCAKE-from an environment of 45 blocks 
strewn about, provided that nine of those blocks already spell fruitcake and so can 
serve as an example tower to copy. The technique his system uses requires having 
snapshots of the entire environment, and moving markers around these snapshots 
to make it possible to keep track of where the next useful block is, which blocks 
must be removed to free that useful block, and so on. Using these markers as a 
way of recording state information it is possible to rely on a simple compiled rule 
system to copy the goal stack. 
To scale this system up to cope with constructing arbitrary goal towers, 
however, requires adding additional markers: one set to mark towers that have 
been successfully built; and a second set to mark the goal towers already built. If 
we did not have these extra markers, then there would be nothing to stop the 
system from cannibalizing target towers for their parts, and nothing to stop the 
system from repeatedly copying goal towers. See Fig. 8(a). Since there is 
considerable cost in maintaining large numbers of markers this is an unattractive 
solution. But, it is not the only solution. If we allow regionafizing the environ- 
ment, and building knowledge of where those regions are into the system, we can 
build arbitrary numbers of towers using just the original markers. 
The trick is to divide the workplace into regions for storing the goal stacks, for 
foraging for blocks, and for building the target stacks, and to create a known 
ordering within those. Thus, region 1 will contain the original goal stacks 
organized in the order they are to be built; region 2 will contain the blocks 
currently available for building towers, possibly organized alphabetically, but that 
is not necessary; and region 3 will contain the new stacks currently being built. A 
pengi-like system will now work successfully as long as we add three more rules. 
As soon as the current goal stack is completed, move to the next stack on the 
right in the goal stack region; if there is no goal stack to the right, announce 
Fig. 8. In (a). we see a typical blocks world situation facing Blockhead, a Pengi-like tower copier. In 
order to reliably copy the goal stack, shown on the right, Blockhead must rely on five visual markers 
to keep track of the stack to copy. the block to copy. the current spot in the stack being cleared, the 
target block to be freed by clearing. as well as the stack being built. To copy more goal stacks would 
require more visual markers. In (b), we see the space regionalized into a goal stack region. a block 
foraging region. and a target stack region. Stacks in the goal and target regions are ordered from left 
to right. If Blockhead knows about these regions it can copy an arbitrary number of stacks without 
relying on more visual markers. 
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success. Build target stacks in the target stack region, starting from the left and 
moving right. Search for blocks only in the resource region. As can be seen in Fig. 
8(b), this is a simple way of preventing cannibalism, duplication, and failure to 
halt. The point, to repeat, is that by creating external regions it is possible to keep 
memory demands within psychologically realistic limits. 
4.3. Symbolic marking 
Yet another technique for categorizing, or identifying an object is to mark the 
object with a cue that draws attention, or prods recall. For instance, when there is 
a pair of hard to distinguish items we wish to differentiate, such as two wooden 
spoons-one used for stirring a dark curry (currently cooking on the left front 
burner), the other for stirring a brown sauce (currently on the right front 
burner)-we may mark their difference by associating them with a known 
distinguisher. For instance, we might keep them on the lids of their respective 
saucepans (particularly if those are different in size), or we may place them beside 
one of the key ingredients (e.g. the curry tin). These are examples of symbolic 
positioning, or marking. 
We have found marking to be an important resource for helping agents monitor 
task state. Here is another example. 
In the videotapes Bernard Conein made of French householders preparing 
apple tarts, we noticed that one cook, upon carefully measuring and cutting a 
butter stick nearly in two, promptly lays her knife on the measured piece as if 
to mark it as the piece to use. Both chunks of butter are similar in 
appearance, so it would be easy to confuse the one with the other. But by 
marking one piece with the knife, the cook has added extra information to 
the environment that can help make clear what to do next. Admittedly, the 
knife’s position on the butter can serve many functions: it keeps the freshly 
used knife from dirtying the countertop, it keeps the knife itself from 
becoming unsanitary, and it places the knife in an orientation that facilitates 
grasping. But as well, it serves an informational function: it marks one half 
stick of butter as being the measured half, and also marks the fact that the 
measuring process itself has taken place. 
Markers are a form of reminder. But with a twist. Whereas perfect reminders 
both signal that something is to be remembered and encode what that something 
is, markers really only serve the first function: they signal that there is something 
here to notice or remember, but not what that is. For a marker to be effective it 
must serve as an easy to use cue for recall. The knife’s thoughtful positioning, 
particularly if regularly so used, can provide the context for recall. 
4.4. Clustering to sharpen perceptual acuity 
So far we have considered how clustering and thoughtful placement can 
highlight the category, or identity, of an item. By making more explicit the 
category of an item, agents can more readily perceptually track the functionally 
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important elements in their environment. Few tasks make this more evident than 
solving jigsaw puzzles. 
Veteran jigsaw puzzlers are often found grouping pieces of similar shape or 
color into distinct piles. Pieces with straight edges are regularly grouped 
together, as are corner pieces, blues, greens, and pieces with similar male 
and female sockets. By sorting pieces that might otherwise be strewn about, 
players drastically reduce the expected time needed to perceptually locate 
appropriate pieces. 
At first this may seem just another case of clustering to produce equivalence 
classes. But more is going on here. In solving a jigsaw puzzle the recurrent 
problem is to identify, from among a large set of pieces, the single one which 
correctly fits the target space. One of the properties of the game that makes it 
hard is that both coarse and fine discriminations are necessary. Coarse discrimina- 
tions help with planning. “Cluster corner pieces! Look for parts of the sky!” But 
fine discriminations are necessary to determine exactly which individual piece will 
fit. Surprisingly, coarse grouping helps with noticing fine discriminations too. 
The general strategy at work here is again a form of informational structuring. 
It is easier for an agent to narrow the search to the correct piece within a coarse 
group than to look for the piece from scratch. If the agent can create a 
hierarchical classification, visual search can be reduced from O(N) to O(log N). 
Hence coarse grouping is a useful preprocessing technique. 
Even more interestingly, a clever grouping can actually increase the fineness of 
distinctions the agent is capable of noticing. I call this the vernier effect. Vernier 
discrimination in visual perception refers to the eye’s ability to distinguish very 
small displacements in the alignment of two objects or lines. This capacity to tell 
whether two lines are lined up or displaced is harnessed in vernier scales (see Fig. 
9). In classification, a similar effect occurs. When a jigsaw piece is buried among a 
variety of rather differently shaped pieces, subjects pick it out on the basis of 
coarse differences. If it is buried among similar shaped pieces, subjects must pick 
it out on the basis of fine differences. These fine differences are noticeable 
precisely because we can lock in visually on subtle differences. Two objects that 
are otherwise indistinguishable can often be distinguished if their images can be 
superimposed. Proximity helps. So does quantity, for we thereby create a 
reference class for comparison which highlights the kind of differences to note. 
We change the resolution of our classification. (See Fig. 9.) 
5. Saving internal computation 
We have considered how spatial arrangements can reduce the amount of mental 
search involved in choice, and also reduce the amount of visual computation 
necessary to monitor current state, notice hints, and search for wanted items. A 
third way an embodied agent can enlist the world is to pass off computation. 
Familiar examples of such offloading show up in analog computations. When the 
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Fig. 9. A vernier is an auxiliary scale that slides along the divisions of a graduated instrument to 
indicate fractions of the divisions of the larger scale. It allows a user to make finer distinctions than 
possible with one scale alone. The perceptual principle verniers rely on is called vernier discrimina- 
tion, which is the capacity of the eye to note when two lines are not perfectly aligned. 
tallest spaghetti noodle is singled out from its neighbors by striking the bundle on 
a table, a sort computation is performed by using the material and spatial 
properties of the world. An agent who encodes size or rank in noodle length, can 
compute a fast sort by means of this physical process, as long as the result can be 
decoded quickly. The method does not involve symbolic computation, or an 
item-by-item comparison. It works by creating a visual cue that serves to make 
the property in question explicit. 
Such computational exploitations of the world are more common than usually 
realized. When a tailor flips over a paper cutout, he is effectively computing a 
description of the mirror image of the original shape. It is not evident that such 
exploitation of the world qualifies as “using space” intelligently. But I shall 
include a discussion of some of the issues because the line between using the 
world, and using the spatial properties of the world, is not an easy one to draw. 
Let us turn now to an example that shows that the mental use of the world can 
occur even at high speed. 
5.1. High speed offloading 
We have found in our laboratory studies of a fast-paced computer game, Tetris 
(see Fig. lo), that players will physically manipulate forms to save themselves 
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Fig. 10. In Tetris. pieces enter the board from the top and the player has to decide whether to move 
them right, left or to rotate them. We have found that there is a burst of rotational activity in a region 
about X00 ms to 1800 ms when the player is working out where to place the piece. External rotation 
can be as fast as 150 ms. whereas internal rotation takes five to ten times as long. By externally 
rotating pieces, players can save time in deciding where to place pieces. 
mental effort [25]. They modify the environment to cue recall, to speed up 
identification, and to generate mental images faster than they could if unaided. In 
short, they make changes to the world to save themselves costly and potentially 
error-prone computations in the head. 
The trick, in every case, is to modify visual input at exactly the right time to 
supply information needed by other computations. This is a version of just in time 
inventory control, only here, the inventory is informational. The effect is a highly 
interactional computation, where the information for a step in the computation is 
sometimes provided internally, and sometimes the information is provided 
externally. What binds the two together into a tightly coupled system is their 
timing. See Fig. 11 for a sketch of the kind of process model this suggests. 
To take one example from Tetris, we found that about 800 to 1800 ms after a 
zoid enters the screen, players display a burst of rotations. See Fig. 10 for an 
explanation of Tetris. One hypothesis is that they rotate the piece rapidly to 
generate the mental icons they need to try out candidate placements. To rotate a 
zoid in the world takes far less time than to rotate its mental image. From our 
own studies we have determined that mental rotation of tetrazoids takes between 
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Fig. 11. In this figure internal processing components are nudged forward in their own computations 
by inputs caused by the agent’s actions. The difference between this and standard cascade models of 
processing is that internal modules here can request motor output without much mediation, causing 
changes in the external environment hat are specifically targeted at improving their own performance. 
From [25]. 
700 and 1500 ms; physical rotation can take place in 150 ms [25]. By shifting the 
burden of imagery formation away from the mental rotation component, and 
giving it, instead, to the faster working motor and perceptual systems, an agent 
can save hundreds of milliseconds. This is what is meant by saying the agent uses 
the world to save internal computation. External rotation solves the problem 
“what would this zoid look like if rotated 90 degrees?” Thus if there is a generate 
and test process occurring in players when they are trying to decide where to 
place a piece, a call to the motor system to physically rotate a piece can supply the 
generator with exactly what it needs. Computational steps are not actually 
eliminated; they are offloaded from the agent to the world. 
5.2. Externalizing representations and perspective flipping 
In high speed interactions, the agent and environment can be so tightly coupled 
that it may be plausible to view the two as forming a single computational system. 
In that case, some elements of the computation are outside the agent, some are 
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inside, and the computation itself consists in the dynamic interaction between the 
two. The general idea that the dynamic relations holding between an embodied 
agent and its environment form a computational system has been advanced by Ed 
Hutchins [19,20] and Sylvia Scribner [43]. 
One fact about human cognition that lends itself to such interpretation is that 
there are important psychological differences between external and internal 
representations, suggesting that sometimes it is more desirable to operate with 
external representations than internal ones, and vice versa. In [7] subjects were 
asked to form mental images of classically ambiguous figures, such as the Necker 
cube, the duck/rabbit. They had been shown several different ambiguous images, 
and understood the relevant notion of ambiguity, although importantly, they were 
naive to the test figures. Chambers and Reisberg found that none of the subjects 
could discover any ambiguity in their images. Evidently, internal representations, 
unlike their external counterparts, seem to come with their interpretation fixed. 
An agent conjuring an image cannot separate the interpretation of the image from 
the image itself. Reisberg [40] had this to say: 
“After subjects had tried (and failed) to reconstrue their image, they were 
asked to draw a picture from the image, and then attempt reconstrual of their 
own drawing. In sharp contrast to the imagery data, 100% of the subjects 
were able to reinterpret their own drawings. (These drawings were in fact 
ambiguous, as a new group of subjects was able to find both construals in 
them.) Once there was a stimulus on the scene (even a self-created one), 
subjects could set aside the understanding they had in mind in creating the 
stimulus, and interpret it anew. In imagery, the understanding is inherent in 
the representation, so that there simply is no representation separate from 
the understanding. With no freestanding icon to interpret, no reinterpretation 
is possible. . . . As long as ideas are internally represented, they exist only via 
a certain context of understanding, so that there can be neither doubt nor 
ambiguity about what is intended.” [40, p. 81 
The implication is that if we want to discover important new elements in a 
structure, particularly if this requires looking for novel interpretations, we are 
better off depicting it externally, or consulting some pre-existing external 
representation of it. The skills we have developed for dealing with the external 
world go beyond those we have for dealing with the internal world. Hence, the 
reason creative activity tends to make such extensive use of external representa- 
tions may be because, in the discovery phase, one wants to note as many possible 
extensions and variations to one’s ideas as possible. This is easier if the 
representations are externalized. 
Now, because computation regularly involves generate and test phases it is 
possible that the most intelligent use of space is to try out conjectures. For 
example, in the game of Scrabble, when we are searching for words, it is 
customary to shuffle tiles around in the hope of triggering an association. We may 
call activity of this sort, self cueing. 
The principle of self cueing is a type of externalization that depends for its 
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success on two factors: an internal module whose operations are, more or less, 
encapsulated from interference by other modules, and a tight coupling between 
internal and external processes. There would be no point fiddling with the outside 
world to jog our memories if we could do the same internally just as fast. The 
extra value flows from the way we associate items. We can get a fresh way of 
looking at our Scrabble tiles, if we shuffle them. This approach crops up in a 
range of self-help techniques. To solve an algebra problem we make explicit many 
of the obvious transformations. To solve a geometry problem we often draw a 
figure, or introduce constructions that alter the appearance of the structure. A 
theory of how externalization improves cognition would certainly go beyond ways 
of using spatial arrangements. But, we can be certain that in any such theory, 
more than lip service will be paid to the role of spatial arrangement. 
6. Conclusion 
Throughout this paper, I have presented ways agents have of managing the 
spatial arrangements of items in their workplace. To make it easier to stay in 
control of activity, we rely on techniques which reduce the memory load of tasks, 
the amount of internal computation necessary, or which simplify the visual search 
and categorization that is inevitably involved in performance. Some of these 
techniques we consciously apply, some we apply unwittingly. But all reflect our 
tight coupling to the world. A coupling becomes tight, when timing becomes 
important. In Tetris, for instance, zoids are rotated in the world to save mental 
rotation. Timing is crucial. A few hundred milliseconds later, and a given rotation 
will fail to carry useful information for a player. In bagging groceries, or in 
cooking, we place items around us at particular moments. If well-timed, such 
placements serve to remind us, to cue attention, to prevent us from considering 
irrelevant alternatives. The virtue of such cues and constraints is that they 
structure the information we take in as input. In fast-paced environments, this 
informational structuring supplies hints and clues that advance computations that 
are in progress. In slower-paced environments, such as Scrabble, jigsaw puzzle 
playing, and shelving books, informational structuring also helps supply ideas, 
hints and distinctions that facilitate problem solving. Even though slower-paced 
tasks involve choices that span tens of seconds, it is still important to have the 
right information at the right time. It is amazing how prevalent such phenomena 
are in our everyday activities. 
One theme which has been recurring, but which I have left largely unexamined, 
is that many of our structuring actions serve to reduce the descriptive complexity 
of our environments. This makes it easier to track the state of the environment. 
The idea first surfaced in our discussion of the advantage of organizing lettered 
blocks alphabetically, or into known chunks, such as morphemes. A planner who 
first arranges blocks alphabetically reduces the need for visual search because he 
or she is able to describe the state of the environment more compactly. The 
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position of a block in an alphabetical list is known by heart, so it can be generated 
without further knowledge of the particulars of the environment. The same 
applies if we organize blocks into well-known units. Given an environment in 
which the letters TEOEPPAPTTASSCERLAEP appear, we put a much smaller 
strain on Working Memory if we manage the environment so that the stimulus we 
see is chunked as in PET TAPE APPLE SOCRATES. Preprocessing the world 
saves processing the representation of the world. Put another way, the greater our 
understanding of the organization we maintain outside, the less we have to 
memorize. 
It is in this spirit of reducing the descriptive complexity of the environment, 
that we can understand the virtue of creating critical cues, such as the relative 
length cue created by the cook who lined up the vegetables, described in the 
introduction. When a cue is both easy to monitor, and it carries all the 
information the agent need to know about the state of the ongoing process, it 
reduces the processing required to track the current state of the environment. It 
reduces the descriptive complexity of that state to a few bits. 
Table 1 summarizes some of the examples discussed in the text. These cases 
span only a fraction of the range of intelligent uses of space in everyday life, but I 
believe they are representative. 
Theorists in AI have dwelled on the intelligent use of time, hardly considering 
space. Yet vision, our primary spatial sense, is one of humanity’s most powerful 
capacities. It is little wonder that diagrams facilitate problem solving. Should we 
not expect that much of our everyday competence might come from information- 
ally structuring our workspace? I have tried to show what, in certain cases, this 
might mean, and why it is a reasonable idea to develop. 
Table 1 
Capacity improved What has been reduced Mechanism 
Recall Probability of an error in 
prospective memory 
Reminders 
Visual search Time complexity of search 
Descriptive complexity of 
environment 
Probability of an error 
Use known orderings such as 
chunks or alphabets 
Perceptual acuity Granularity of perception 
Micro-categorization 
Vernier effect 
Reasoning Time complexity of planning Cue next action through a known 
ordering 
Execution Probability of capture error Maximize cue separation 
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